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In the face of the epidemic of copyright infringement that
has been afflicting our nation, I suggest that the federal courts
have been under-utilized for the prosecution of copyright crimes.
There are those who might find this a strange statement for me to
make, since I am the author of a nwnber of articles railing
against the expansion of the criminal jurisdiction of the federal
courts. 1

But my criticism has been directed at the

congressional exercise of power to criminalize conduct that
traditionally has been the concern of the states.

I have

recommended that the. definition of federal crimes be limited to
anti-social behavior that primarily is

a matter

of national

concern. 2
In an effort to consolidate and pare down the 3,000-odd
United States Code provisions criminalizing acts and omissions of
various kinds, I would also eliminate a number of anachronistic
provisions.

Among these are the transportation of water

hyacinths in interstate commerce, 3 the impersonation of a member
of the 4-H Club, 4 and the movement of dentures into a state
without the permission of a local dentist. 5

Ever since the

Supreme Court decided that Congress could define a crime on the
basis of conduct that somehow affects interstate commerce, 6
Congress has demonstrated precious little capacity for selfrestraint in this area.

After all, what legislator can resist
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advising his or her constituents that a new federal crime has
been defined and, accordingly, that some problem or other has
been solved?

The fact that a corresponding state crime already

exists is of no moment to those who enact our federal laws.
The situation is much different, in my opinion, when it
comes to the definition of copyright crimes.

Copyright i..§. a

matter of national interest, and it has been so since the
adoption of the federal constitution.

The Constitution not only

confers upon Congress the power to legislate in the area of
copyrights and patents, but it also tells us why such legislation
is socially beneficial: the power is to enact laws to "secur[e]
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries;" the beneficial
purpose of such laws is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
Useful Arts. 117

James Madison, one of the authors of that well-

known series of persuasive articles urging ratification of the
Constitution, made some interesting comments about these
provisions.

In Federalist No. 43, Madison wrote:

The utility of this power will scarcely
be questioned. The copy right of authors has
been solemnly adjudged in Great Britain to be
a right at common law. The right to useful
inventions, seems with equal reason to belong
to inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases, with the claims of
individuals. The States cannot separately
make effectual provisions for either of these
cases. 8
Madison thus made two important points, both of which favor
copyright enforcement through federal criminal prosecution.
First, he observed that the public good, by which he meant the
2

national interest, coincides with the copyright claims of
individuals, by which he meant the private interest.

Second, he

asserted that the States cannot be effective in separately
providing for copyright enforcement.
second point a little later.

I shall return to the

As to Madison's first point, the

Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear just what is the more
important interest to be served.

The Court has written that the

monopoly privileges granted to authors and inventors are "limited
in nature and must ultimately serve the public good. 119

The

Court also has written that "copyright law . . • serves the
purpose of enriching the general public through access to
creative works, 11 10 and that "private motivation must

...

serve

its cause of promoting broad public availability of literature,
music and the other arts. 1111

In a recent case holding that

ordinary compilations generally are not copyrightable, the
supreme Court put it this way:
[C)opyright assures authors the right to
their original expression, but encourages
them to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work. 12
We are thus left with the understanding that the purpose of
copyright law is no less than the dissemination of knowledge, the
promotion of cultural enrichment, the conveyance of information
and the consequent betterment of society through the
encouragement of creativity and innovation.

This being so, what

could be a more important matter of national interest than the
enforcement of copyright law?
Although the first Congress recognized the national policy
3

implications of the Copyright Clause by enacting the first
copyright law in 1790, 13 it was not until 1897 that the first
criminal copyright provision found congressional approval. 14
That provision established a misdemeanor penalty for unlawful
performances and presentations of copyrighted dramatic and
musical compositions.

In order for the penalty to be imposed, it

was necessary to establish that the defendant's conduct was
"willful" and "for profit. 1115

The 1909 Copyright Act extended

the misdemeanor penalty to all types of copyrighted works, except
sound recordings, and continued the same mens rea language. 16
Sound recordings were brought within the coverage of the statute
by the Sound Recording Act of 1971. 17

The 1976 Copyright Act

restated the offense of copyright infringement as a misdemeanor,
providing fines of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not
more than one year or both. 18

In the case of sound recordings

or motion pictures, the statute provided for fines of up to
$25,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year or both.
Repeat offenders could be fined up to $50,000 or punished by up
to two years of imprisonment or both.

The 1976 Act changed the

mens rea element to require that the infringing conduct be
engaged in "willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain. 11 19
It was not until 1982, almost two hundred years after the
first copyright statute and eighty-five years after the first
criminal provision, that felony sanctions for copyright
infringement were authorized.

In that year, responding to the
4

demands of the sound recording and motion picture industries, 20
criminal copyright infringements involving the reproduction or
distribution of records, motion pictures and audiovisual works
were designated as feloriies. 21

While the criminal offense was

still defined in Title 17, the Copyrights title of the U.S. Code,
the felony penalty provisions were established in a new section
of Title 18, the Crimes and Criminal Procedure title. 22

The

felony penalty provision applied to a defendant convicted of
reproducing or distributing, during any 180-day period, at least
one thousand phonorecords or copies infringing the copyright in
one or more sound recordings or at least sixty-five copies
infringing the copyright in one or more motion pictures or other
audiovisual works. 2~

The penalties consisted of imprisonment of

the infringer for up to five years, a fine of up to $250,000 or
both. 24

The same fine, with imprisonment for no more than two

years, applied in the case of more than one hundred but less than
one thousand phonorecords and more than seven but less than
sixty-five copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual
works.~

All other criminal copyright infringement offenses

continued to be classified as misdemeanors. 26
A case involving a felony prosecution under the 1982 Act
came to my court in 1991. 27

The defendant, one Julio

Larracuente, owned and operated a videocassette rental store.

An

investigator for the Motion Picture Association of America
identified tapes rented by the store as counterfeit, and a
surveillance was undertaken by the investigator and, later, by an
5

FBI agent.

The defendant was observed unloading boxes of blank

videotapes from his car into his home and taking videotapes from
his home to his store.

A search of his house, conducted pursuant

to a warrant, revealed 1,670 counterfeit videocassettes of
movies, 78 VCRs, videotape copying equipment of various types and
hundreds of cassette covers and stickers.

The jury convicted

defendant of both the substantive and conspiracy offenses of
criminal copyright infringement.

In answer to interrogatories,

the jury specifically found that the defendant had made at least
sixty-five copies of copyrighted films within a 180-day period,
the statutory threshold calling for a punishment of up to five
years in prison and a fine of up to $250,000.

The district court

imposed a sentence of twelve months, the bottom of the Guidelines
sentencing range.
We took the opportunity in the Larracuente case to address
two issues previously unresolved in our circuit.

One was a

defense analogous to the defense of "first sale, 1128 and the
other was the method of ascertaining "retail value" under the
Sentencing Guidelines. 29

It was the contention of the defendant

on appeal that the government had failed in its obligation to
prove that licensees of the copyright owners had not authorized
him to reproduce the films.

We decided that the elements of the

criminal offense to be proven were the same as those in a civil
copyright case -- ownership of a valid copyright and copying.
was, of course, also necessary for the government to establish
the mens rea requirement as well as the numerosity and temporal
6

It

threshold requirements.

The possession of a sub-license, we

held, was a matter of affirmative defense. 30

Even if the

absence of a sub-license was an element, a defendant would have
to introduce some evidence of a sub-license in order for the
prosecution to shoulder the burden of negating that element
beyond a reasonable doubt.

This shifting of the burden of

production seems to be the better approach and has been taken by
most courts in connection with the similar defense of "first
sale," which permits the owner of a copy lawfully made to sell or
otherwise dispose of the copy without the authority of the
copyright owner. 31

The first sale doctrine is said to vitiate

the copyright owner's power to prevent further sales or
dispositions, and the legislative history seems to oblige a
defendant to come forward with evidence that the copies were
legally made in order to take advantage of the first sale
doctrine.
Turning to the sentencing issue in Larracuente, I first note
that I am no fan of the Sentencing Guidelines.

When the

Guidelines took effect in November of 1987, their starting point
was the average sentence that had been imposed before the
effective date of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
spawned the Guidelines. 32

The Sentencing Commission never has

really taken a fresh look at those averages, with the result that
some sentences remain much too high and some remain much too low.
In any event, we now have a formulaic approach to sentencing,
based in large part on the offense rather than upon the offender.
7

So much for giving sentencing discretion to a commission rather
than to a judge!

It seems to me, in light of the national policy

with which we are concerned, that the penalties for copyright
felonies are much too low.

Turning to the specific formula for

the offense of copyright infringement, we find that the base
offense level of six is to be enhanced as follows: "If the retail
value of the infringing items exceeded $2,000, increase by the
corresponding number of levels from the table" that applies to
fraud and deceit offenses. 33

If that is not confusing enough,

the Guidelines commentary advises us that "'[i]nfringing items'
means the items that violate the copyright .

laws (not the

legitimate items that are infringed upon). 1134

We are also told

that "the value of the infringing items • • • will generally
exceed the loss or gain due to the offense. 1135
In Larracuente, we approved the district judge's application
of the Sentencing Guidelines. 36

The judge accepted the

prosecution expert's testimony that the retail price of the films
copied averaged $73 per copy.

She multiplied that price times

2,652 tapes, which included those seized from defendant's home
and from a store he supplied as well as those purchased by
investigators.

The total, $193,596, resulted in a 7-level

adjustment, which, in the case of Larracuente converted to a
sentencing range of twelve to eighteen months.

He was sentenced

on the low end of the range, an especially light sentence
considering the statutory maximum of five years.

Defendant's

operation appeared to be a substantial one, but, according to the
{
8

sentencing Guidelines table, defendant as a first offender would
have had to infringe more than $80 million dollars worth of
retail value to get the maximum sentence of imprisonment.

And

that is one of the reasons why I say that the Guidelines make no
sense.
The most recent amendment to the criminal copyright statute,
enacted in 1992, has an interesting history.

Congress originally

had before it a bill to elevate the piracy of computer software
from a misdemeanor offense to a felony offense. 37

The bill came

in response to a serious escalation in the infringement of
computer software copyrights and was intended to make the
unauthorized production and distribution of multiple copies of
computer software equally as culpable as the unauthorized
/

11,
'·

production and distribution of multiple copies of phonorecords,
sound recordings and motion

pictures.~

Remarks attributed in the Congressional Record to Senator
Hatch included the statements that "stiffer penalties toward
piracy do act as a deterrent to these types of crimes," and that
"these new penalties for large-scale violations of copyright in
computer software will have a similar deterrent effect. 1139

The

remarks also included the following: "If we do not address the
piracy of these programs, we may soon see a decline in this
vibrant and important sector of our economy. ,, 4o Referring to
the 1982 statute and the felony penalties provided therein,
Senator Hatch said: "It is my understanding that this law, the
criminal enforcement of copyright statute found at 18 u.s.c.
9

§

2319, has worked well since its enactment. 1141

I do not know

where Senator Hatch obtained this information, but it is wrong.
If the 1982 statute was intended to deter piracy in records and
movies, it has failed woefully.

But I suppose that rose-colored

glasses are part of the equipment of a United States senator.
The bill to increase criminal sanctions for the violation of
software copyrights underwent a metamorphosis in the House of
Representatives.

It was there decided that the felony penalty

provisions should be extended across-the-board to all types of
large-scale copyright infringement, including motion pictures,
books, records and computer software. 42

The bill eventually

became "An Act to amend title 18, United States Code, with
respect to criminal penalties for copyright infringement."
Further remarks attributed to Senator Hatch on the return of the
bill from the House included this important comment:
(T]his criminal statute is not designed to
reach instances of permissible, private home
copying, nor does it represent any
infringement on traditional concepts
permitting the fair use of copyrighted
materials for purposes of research,
criticism, scholarshig, parody and other
long-recognized uses.
We hear in these remarks the language of fair use, which
apparently is to be as good a defense to criminal copyright
infringement as it is to civil copyright infringement.

Moreover,

the legislative history indicates that the Copyright Felony Act
is not to be applied to "ordinary business disputes such as those
involving reverse engineering of computer programs or contract
disputes over the scope of licenses. 1144
10

Section 2319 in its new form still refers to Title 17 to
define the mens rea element of criminal copyright infringement.
Title 17 provides:
Any person who infringes a copyright
willfully and_ for purposes of commercial
advantage or private financial gain shall be
punished as provided in section 2319 of title
18. 45
But effective October 28, 1992, the penalty provisions of section
2319 were expanded to apply to all copyright infringements.

For

purposes of the felony penalties, the threshold numerosity
requirements have been significantly reduced, but a minimum value
threshold has been added.
The five-year sentence, $250,000 fine provisions now apply
to one who reproduces or distributes during any period of 180
days "at least 10 copies or phonorecords, of 1 or more
copyrighted works, with a retail value of more than $2, 500. 1146
For a second or subsequent copyright felony offense, the maximum
prison sentence is ten years. 47

Again, it is unlikely that

anyone will ever receive such a sentence.

According to those

wonderful Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant would need to be
responsible for more than $80 million dollars worth of infringing
items and have something like five prior felony convictions to
get a ten-year sentence.
For criminal copyright infringements that cannot meet the
threshold requirements, as regards reproduction or distribution
rights, misdemeanor penalties continue to apply.

such penalties

also continue to apply to violations of adaptation, performance
11

and display rights.

It is a rare thing indeed for a United

states Attorney to initiate a misdemeanor prosecution in any
case, let alone a copyright infringement case.

It should be

noted, however, that in connection with any criminal copyright
conviction the court must order the forfeiture and destruction of
the infringing copies or phonorecords as well as all equipment
used in manufacturing the

items.~

Any sentence for a copyright

infringement crime may also, of course, entitle the victim to
restitution under the federal Victim and Witness Protection
Act. 49
The addition of a minimum retail value threshold in the 1992
amendment to the felony copyright statute has raised once again
the question posed by the Sentencing Guidelines• reference to
"retail value."

It is generally understood that the definition

given by my court in Larracuente was the correct one: retail
value, in a case involving copies of good quality, is the
suggested retail price of the legitimate copyrighted work when it
was released and not the value of the infringing copies. 50

If

the work is not ordinarily marketed through normal retail
channels, courts may look to the wholesale price, the replacement
cost of the item or financial injury to the copyright owner. 51
Whatever approach is used, it should not be difficult to reach
the $2,500 retail value threshold for a felony prosecution,
considering value

g~nerally

in this day and age.

And that raises

some interesting questions.
For example, a panel of my court recently held that the
12

defense of fair use was not established where a company
reproduced and distributed to its scientists for archival use
certain articles of interest taken from scientific journals. 52
I do not say whether or not the panel opinion is the last word on
the subject.

I do raise the question whether, if enough copies

of the articles (certainly more than ten) were distributed within
a period of 180 days and had a value that could be proved to
exceed $2,500, the felony threshold could be met.

And that would

lead to the question of whether there could be said to exist a
willful infringement for purposes of commercial advantage or
private financial gain.

Is the distribution of articles to be

filed away by scientists for possible future use in their work an
activity manifesting a purpose of commercial activity or private
financial gain?

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has said

that it is sufficient in a criminal prosecution to show that
infringing activity is intended for commercial advantage or
private financial gain, and that such advantage or gain need not
be realized. 53

In the context of our civil case, we noted that

the company did not gain a direct or immediate commercial
advantage, and we classified the use as "intermediate. 1154

How

such a classification would stand up in a criminal case remains
to be seen.
The failure of the fair use defense also may result in the
imposition of criminal liability upon book publishers.

There is

at least exposure to criminal liability in cases where large
chunks of copyrighted material are lifted from the work of the
13

original author and inserted in the work of another.

Having

written an opinion on the issue of fair use of unpublished
material in a biographical novel, 55 I am well aware of the fine
line between fair use and foul play. 56

Although my opinion did

not receive the unanimous approval of the copyright community and
may well have been a contributing cause to the amendment of the
fair use statute, the defendant publisher actually prevailed on
the defense of !aches.

Assuming that the use of the unpublished

material was impermissible, would criminal liability attach?
certainly there was distribution for commercial advantage.

I

think that a good criminal defense lawyer would argue that
willfulness could not be established and, accordingly, that mens
rea could not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

The lifting

of entire books and publications, however, clearly would fall
under the criminal copyright statute, although it does not appear
that very many prosecutions of book infringers have occurred to
date.
It does not in fact appear that very many prosecutions of
any kind have occurred under the copyright infringement statute.
According to the Statistical Reports of the United States
Attorneys' Offices, 46 criminal copyright cases were filed and 64
cases were terminated in 1993. 57
and 46 were terminated. 58

In 1992, 54 cases were filed

These are national statistics and

seem to pale into insignificance in the face of the enormity of
the problems the criminal copyright statute was designed to
resolve.

For example, the Software Publishers of America ("SPA")
14

has estimated that software vendors lost $2 billion in the United
States in 1991 due to illegal software copying. 59

93% of those

polled by the SPA said that they had copied or used software
illegally at some time.~

It was estimated that there were ten

illegal copies for every legal copy of a computer game and five
illegal copies for every legal copy of non-game software. 61

In

a household survey, up to 50% of software in household use was
found to be copied.~

The problem of identifying software

piracy in homes, referred to by one author as "softlifting," 63
is a particularly difficult one.

Software piracy in general has

proven difficult to investigate, and the SPA, sometimes referred
to as the "software police," have gone so far as to provide a
Manual to assist the FBI and the United states Attorneys in the
investigation and prosecution of software piracy.M

According

to one news dispatch, the SPA is considering the pursuit of
legislation that would criminalize the illegal copying of
software, whether done for profit or not. 65
The disease is only slightly less virulent in the case of
recordings and motion pictures.

The Motion Picture Association

of America estimates that filmmakers lose $220 million dollars a
year in domestic sales. 66

The Recording Industry Association

says it loses $600 million each year due to domestic music
piracy. 67

Estimates of the losses sustained through the piracy

of American copyrighted works world-wide are mind-boggling: $1.2
billion dollars annually in the case of recordings; $2 billion
dollars annually in the case of films; and $7.5 billion annually
15

in the case of business application

software.~

The protection

of American industry from foreign piracy has become a goal of our
national foreign policy.

This is so because foreign nations have

seemed quite reluctant to assist in the enforcement of our
country's copyrights, especially by criminal prosecution.

For

example, it has been estimated that 95% of all software installed
in Russia has been obtained

illegally.~

Bootleg videocassettes

in Russia are available in titles not yet available in the United
States.ro

Copyright laws generally are ignored, and there are

no criminal enforcement penalties in Russia.
The problems of intellectual property piracy in China have
been widely reported, and one source has estimated the cost to
United States industries through the piracy Of U.S. patents,
trademarks and copyrights in China at nearly $1 billion dollars
per year. 71

According to one news dispatch, "[t]he U.S. has

been pressing China to raid 29 plants in southern China, which
allegedly flood Asia with pirated laser and compact discs."n
On the verge of imposing punitive tariffs on Chinese exports, the
U.S. Trade Representative reported to Congress on a recent
agreement whereby China promised to enforce vigorously copyright
and other intellectual property rights.~

An enforcement

mechanism supposedly was created to investigate, prosecute and
punish infringing activities throughout China.

Time will tell

whether the Chinese government is interested in eradicating this
billion-dollar industry.

l

But China and Russia are not the only countries that fail to

l\
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enforce copyright laws with adequate criminal penalties.

Mexico

was, until 1991, one of seven countries with the largest pirate
industries and least effective intellectual property
protections. 74

Apparently, Mexico reformed its copyright laws

in 1991 to expand enforcement activities.

The North American

Free Trade Agreement, to which Mexico is a signatory, refers to
criminal enforcement of intellectual property but leaves it to
each signatory to define the violations.

There are recent

reports of the enactment of criminal provisions for the
infringement of copyright law in Poland, 75 Belgium, 76
Thailand, 77 and Panama.~

But as with every criminal statute,

there must be investigation and prosecution if the statute is to
have any meaning.

Past experience does not bode well for the

future on the international scene.

In the event that we cannot

get the cooperation of other countries, I have a thought with
regard to the matter.
It is a well-settled principle of international law that a
nation may attach criminal liability to acts occurring outside
the nation that produce effects within the nation.~

This

theory of jurisdiction was enunciated by Justice Holmes in a 1911
Supreme court decision in which he wrote: "Acts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing effects
within it, justify a state in punishing the cause of the harm as
if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed
in getting him within its power. 1180

Of course, Justice Holmes

was talking about a domestic state rather than a foreign state,
17

but the principle is the same.

congress has relied on this

theory of jurisdiction to prohibit the manufacture of drugs in
foreign nations intending the substances to be imported into the
United states or knowing that they will be so imported. 81

If we

cannot get the cooperation of foreign nations for the
investigation and prosecution of copyright crimes that victimize
the American economy and American national interests, extraterritorial jurisdiction may be an option.
Prosecution begins at home, however, and there seems to be
precious little of that at present.

Given the tendency of United

states Attorneys to become interested in high-profile crimes,
there probably is not much romance for them in the prosecution of
copyright crimes.

To be fair, however, the federal prosecutors

cannot possibly prosecute in every situation involving an
activity defined as criminal by a generous Congress.
is necessary.

Selectivity

There are, nevertheless, certain other crimes that

often accompany criminal copyright infringement and that can be
charged along with it.

This is the type of "piling on" that may

be interesting to prosecutors.

The number of these other crimes

is severely restricted by the Dowling case, decided by the
Supreme Court in 1985. 82

In that case, which involved the

manufacture and distribution of bootleg Elvis Presley recordings,
the Court held that the statute proscribing the interstate
transportation of goods stolen or taken by fraud did not cover
this conduct.

The Court observed that the property rights of

copyright holders have a character distinct from the possessory
18

interests of the owners of other goods.

It concluded that the

history of the criminal infringement provisions of the Copyright
Act indicated that Congress did not intend to cover the conduct
in question under the interstate transportation rubric.

Most

commentators are of the opinion that the Dowling case restricts
the prosecution of copyright infringement to the criminal
copyright statute.M
There are some other federal criminal statutes dealing
specifically with copyright activities other than the felony
statute whose evolution I have been discussing.

These include

fraudulent use of a copyright notice,M fraudulent removal of a
copyright

notice,~

and false representation in connection with

a copyright application.M

Conspiracy to commit any of the

copyright crimes also is, of course, a separate crime. 87

The

crime of money laundering encompasses criminal copyright
infringement as a "specified unlawful activity. 1188

It is

interesting that felony copyright infringement is not listed as
one of the predicate offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and
corrupt Organization statute. 89

I think that the prosecution of

copyright crimes would be considerably enhanced if it were
included.

Effective December 8, 1994, a new copyright felony has

been added: unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound
recordings and music videos of live musical

performances.~

A

new section 2319A has been added to Title 18 of the U.S. Code as
part of the Bill entitled "An Act to Approve and Implement the
Trade Agreements Concluded in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
19

Trade Negotiations."

The new statute pertains to sounds and

images of a live musical performance and provides felony
penalties for violations.

The lack of performance protection in

the provisions of section 2319 finally are remedied by the
adoption of section 2319A.
There is a serious question whether copyright-related
activities can be the subject of criminal prosecution in the
state courts.

Apparently, some state law enforcement agencies

proceed on the basis of state fraud laws or statutes imposing
sanctions for passing off counterfeit merchandise. 91

In 1973,

the Supreme Court decided that it was permissible to convict
under a California statute providing criminal penalties for
piracy of sound recordings. 92

The Court held there was no

violation of the Supremacy Clause because there was then no
conflict with the federal copyright law.

This situation changed

entirely when the Sound Recording Act of 1971 was passed by
congress.

Latman makes the flat-out statement that "[s]tate

prosecution for criminal activity with regard to copyright
infringement are, of course, preempted, except as regards pre1972 sound recordings."~

His authority is section 301 of Title

17, which does provide for federal preemption of the entire field
of copyright.

I am not as sure as Latman that state laws can so

easily be written off.

In this regard, I refer to section 3231

of the Federal Criminal Code:
The district courts of the United States
shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of
the States of all offenses against the laws
of the United States.
20

Nothing in this Title shall be held to
take away·or impair the jurisdiction of the
courts of the several States under the laws
thereof.~

Whether or not the states have some residual or peripheral
area of responsibility, it seems clear that Madison had it right
when he said that states cannot make effective provisions in
these cases.

The states just do not have the resources or the

expertise to pursue the criminal prosecution of copyright
infringement.

I predict that there will be greater involvement

of federal law enforcement agencies in these prosecutions.

The

author of one article suggesting that the Copyright Office may
become obsolete in the next century has observed "that it appears
that virtually every copyright infringement is a misdemeanor and
a great many are felonies."~

Accordingly, one of her proposals

is that the FBI might take over the Copyright Office.

I would

not go that far!
In view of the national interests served, copyright
infringement properly has been designated a federal crime.

The

provisions for increased penalties have not yet had much of a
deterrent effect, as is evidenced by the rise in large-scale
infringements of all types of copyrighted works.

The

resourcefulness of the infringers is well-known to all who are
interested in copyright protection.

Some adjustments in the

Sentencing Guidelines may be required so as to increase the
penalties for copyright crimes.

Also, the RICO statute might be

extended to include copyright felonies as predicate acts, but the
real problem seems to be that too few federal prosecutions have
21

been instituted to make the criminal provisions a credible
deterrent to copyright infringement.

Greater efforts must be

made by those affected to cooperate with federal law enforcement
authorities by bringing infringements to their attention and
assisting in the investigations.%

With this type of

assistance, perhaps there would be more activity in this area by
the United states Attorneys.

In any event, it seems to me

inevitable, given the increasing boldness of those who engage in
large-scale copyright infringement, that all of us who are
concerned with copyright law will be more and more involved in
considering copyright crimes.

22
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